

# The End of National Belonging? Future Scenarios of National Belonging from Migration Experiences of Taiwanese Businessmen in Shenzhen\*

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## Abstract

*Nation-states were usually understood as "Imagined Communities" (Anderson, 1991) with numerous people, having an undivided loyalty to a common government, and a shared past among its members. Hence, immigrants were forced to abandon or deny their ties to their societies of origin. Globalization and transmigrants, however, have greatly changed this situation. Transmigrants construct their simultaneous embedded social relationships in more than one society and preserve their culture and identity to the societies from which they first emigrated. This is the case presented by Taiwanese businessmen in Shenzhen.*

*At the present time, many Taiwanese conduct businesses in China, especially in the city of Shenzhen (the first special economic zone in China). There was an assumption that through more interactions between Taiwanese businessmen or managers and local Chinese, a closer shared national identity would emerge. This paper disproves this assumption, arguing that the daily interactions between these two groups consistently showed a sense of remoteness. The net effect of such a type of migration is that multiple, transnational and sometimes hybrid national identities emerge. Is this the end of national belonging? What is the possible and desirable future scenario in terms of the notion of belonging and citizenship? This paper presents three possible future scenarios of national belonging and citizenship. These are: 1) territorialized national identities and singular citizenship, 2) hybrid national identities and denizenship, and 3) deterritorialized social identities and transnational citizenship.*

**Keywords:** future scenarios, migration, national belonging, Taiwanese businessmen

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## Introduction

*"There is a big difference between Taiwanese businessmen and other foreign investors investing in Mainland China. The latter ones, like many Japanese companies, have invested in Taiwan in the past few years. Once they saw a better chance in profits at another place, companies immediately gave up their investments in Taiwan and went to Mainland China for new investments. This can be shown in the case of the international telecommunication company Motorola. Motorola has invested in Taiwan several times, but has always repeated an investing process of setting up and giving up again its branch company in Taiwan. This is because profitability is the priority for foreign investors. However, most Taiwanese factories treat their investments in Mainland China in a different fashion. Taiwanese factories think that if they invest in China for a longer period, they might choose to stay, and probably for a long time. One important reason why Taiwanese businessmen make this decision is largely because of the relationship between Taiwanese businessmen and Taiwanese society, which is getting looser and looser. If they went on a holiday back to Taiwan, usually is for only visiting relatives and other old friends. Their social networks in Taiwan greatly change. Like myself and other Taiwanese businessmen, we have set up our factories in Mainland China for several years; hence, we seek to establish new relationships, and to have a new network of friends. If the People's Communist Party of China allowed Taiwanese businessmen in China to enjoy social benefits and privileges in their citizenship, there will be a great number of Taiwanese considering to naturalize as Chinese citizens" (2000, 112).*

During the last ten years, there has been a remarkable upsurge of interest in researches about Taiwanese businessmen in China. Many scholars have paid close attention to the interactions between Taiwanese businessmen and local government officials (Hsing, 1996 & 1998; Wu, 1997). Also, the process of network-building among Taiwanese factories in China, which form a specific type of investment, was well studied (Chang & Wu, 2000). Other researchers focused on the relationships between Taiwanese businessmen and their Mainland Chinese employees in factories (Deng, 2002 & 2003; Schak, 2000). Yet, there are little studies conducted on the non political-economic side of Taiwanese businessmen in China, i.e. the social consequences of their border-crossing behaviors<sup>1</sup>. While batches of Taiwanese businessmen go to China, and try to get better profit opportunities in the huge and fast developing market, they need to face the problem whether and how their social relationships have changed in their daily lives. Do Taiwanese businessmen originally aim to invest in China, but as quoted above, most of them end up migrating to China?

This paper portrays migration experiences of Taiwanese business people in Shenzhen. The first argument of this paper is that Taiwanese businessmen in Shenzhen are becoming a group of *potential immigrants* to Mainland China. This is caused by the fact that most Taiwanese businessmen and managers now spend more time in China than they do in Taiwan in the period of one year.

The Second argument of this paper is to show a sense of remoteness from the daily interactions between Taiwanese business people and Mainland Chinese.

Interviews with Taiwanese businessmen disclosed the difficulty for Taiwanese businessmen or managers to fully incorporate into Chinese society. However, it was assumed that through more interactions between the Taiwanese businessmen or managers and local Chinese, a shared national identity would likely emerge. The net effect of such a type of migration is that multiple, transnational and sometimes hybrid national identities surfaced.

Based on the transnational belonging of Taiwanese businessmen, this paper delves deeper with the question: what is the possible and desirable future scenario regarding the notion of belonging and citizenship? Three possible future scenarios of national belonging and citizenship will be provided and discussed. These are: 1) territorialized national identities and singular citizenship, 2) hybrid national identities and denizenship, and 3) deterritorialized social identities and transnational citizenship. It will be suggested that while the global movement is of great significance in the future and mobile populations like Taiwanese businessmen are constantly increasing, the last two forms of scenarios should be more seriously considered.

Much of the qualitative data in this paper is based on field work conducted in the area of Shenzhen<sup>2</sup> over a seven-year period between 1999 and 2006. I conducted interviews, both with Taiwanese business owners and managers, and Mainland Chinese. These interviewees were selected according to the principle of "theoretical sampling" (Strauss, 1997), which was a sampling strategy used in many qualitative studies<sup>3</sup>. These interviewees include Taiwanese business owners and managers that have invested in or entered Shenzhen in different periods of time, Chinese core employees in Taiwanese factories, Chinese secretaries in the Association of Taiwanese Businessmen, local Chinese government officials as well as local Chinese businessmen who conduct business with Taiwanese factories.

### **Taiwanese Businessmen in Mainland China are Becoming a Group of "Potential Immigrants"**

In recent years, not only the number of foreign immigrants in Taiwan has risen, but also the proportion of Taiwanese people migrating to other countries. There are two major patterns of migration that the Taiwanese people usually adopt when migrating to foreign countries. One pattern of migration is based on the *business migration programs*, provided by industrial countries like Canada and the U.S.A. This kind of programs recruits immigrants that have business skills and capital. Since the 1980s, a large number of Taiwanese utilized this pattern of migration and obtained a permanent residence in those countries they migrated (Schak, 1999; Tseng, 1997 & 2000).

The second pattern of migration is the moving to a foreign country for work or business purposes. The majority of Taiwanese business owners and managers, who invested and now work in China, meet this pattern of migration. However, some Taiwanese scholars argue that the latter should not be called "migration". Instead, it should be termed "relocation", and Taiwanese businessmen and managers in China should be regarded as "temporary migrants"<sup>4</sup>. If we call these Taiwanese businessmen and managers a group of "temporary migrants", we mean by their moving from their residence in Taiwan to another investment location in China due to reasons of their

investments or jobs being situated in China. They would live there only for a short period of time. After this time period, if these Taiwanese managers have finished their work contracts in China, they would move back to their original residence in Taiwan. Additionally, if Taiwanese businessmen out of different reasons gave up their investments or relocated their factories elsewhere, they might leave China and go back to Taiwan. In such kind of mobility process, a change in national identity does not take place.

In the era of globalization, the world is characterized by a global restructuring of capital and rapid mobility of people. Border crossing activities are made more easily, and more frequently than before. Therefore, "migration" should not be treated as a counter-concept of "relocation" and refers to a totally different social phenomenon. Instead, there might be a considerable overlap between these two concepts. Recent studies about migration have pointed out the weakness of traditional migration studies and suggest a new understanding of this phenomenon (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Blanc-Szanton, 1994; Faist, 2000a; Glick Schiller, Basch, & Blanc, 1992). In the early migration studies, immigrants were usually seen as a social group that had cut ties from their societies of origin once they moved out. The "Uprootedness of Immigrants" (Glick Schiller, Basch, & Blanc, 1997, p.125) has characterized the whole history of this social group. Immigrants were encouraged to incorporate to the new society as soon as possible. During this process, the direction of the migration is assumed as a single arrow and its decision as irreversible.

Recent studies have found that migrants usually create social fields that cross national boundaries (Wong & Ng, 2002, p.510). The frequency of their travels between their country of origin and their new settlement is very high. Many immigrants maintain complicated relationships in two countries. A final decision of permanent settlement in their new country is still not made. Therefore, the social and national identity of immigrants is not fixed (Fassman, 2002, p.345).

Certainly, the purpose why many Taiwanese businessmen go to Mainland China is at the first place not migrating to China, but conducting business or working there. However, as long as the process of mobility, according to Treibel (1999, p.19), links with a change of main residence, crossing over different societies and constantly living in abroad, will contain the main characteristics of a migration process. Under such kind of definition, every Taiwanese businessman in China becomes somewhat also an immigrant in his investment place. Like other immigrants, they are forced to face the problems of adjusting themselves to local society. In the following sections, I will report the adjusting problems of Taiwanese businessmen in China from observations and intensive interviews in my field research.

### **The Experiences of *Taibao* Passport<sup>5</sup>**

For many Taiwanese business people, the *Taibao* passport (passport for the Taiwanese residents entering China) means, not merely an official document to visit China legally, but also gives them a special citizenship for which they are differently treated compared to local Chinese. A Taiwanese businessman who was first in China in 1993, stated his personal experience:

*"Until several years ago, it could not be seen as an advantage to hold a 'Taibao passport'. Why? Because you would be regarded as a foreigner, and therefore obtaining a different treatment. What kind of different treatment? For such unfairness, I had once protested at that time. I said, in the same traveling place – 'the World Windows in Shenzhen' – everyone experienced the same scenic spot no matter how he is a Taiwanese or a local Chinese, right?! But, why does a Mainland Chinese pay only 50 Yuan for the entrance, while a Taiwanese pays 100 Yuan, twice the price? Does a Taiwanese really have more experience than a Mainland Chinese does? If we go to the same restaurant, one person orders a meal for 50 Yuan and the other person orders a meal for 100 Yuan, and these two guys get different meals, I totally agree in this. Being rich, I can eat a bit better! But now we visit the same place, I've not seen any more special things than you do, why should I pay twice the price? In the early times, from this point of view, we Taiwanese businessmen didn't get any advantage. Even you buy a flying ticket or a train ticket, any kind of tickets, you should pay twice the price than a normal Mainland Chinese would pay – Just the same as a foreigner!" (2000, 19)*

In the later 1980s and early 1990s, Taiwanese businessmen did not conceive of themselves being treated fairly in comparison with most Mainland Chinese. A differential treatment between Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese was often experienced in the daily lives of Taiwanese businessmen. Taiwanese used to pay more than native Chinese, as long as they utilized public services. This made the Taiwanese businessmen feel treated in China closer to a foreigner than a native Chinese.

This kind of a dual payment policy in public transport systems and traveling places was abolished in 1997. The old policy is now replaced by a new one called "citizen treatment system" (國民待遇制度). Since then, unfair treatment of Taiwanese in China is only seldom. In contrast, now Taiwanese businessmen enjoy many privileges that most of the native Chinese do not have. One of these privileges is passing through the border checkpoint. For example, if a Chinese citizen wants to pass through the border checkpoint and enters in the inner-city area of Shenzhen (ie. Special Economic Zone), it is usually more complicated for the Chinese than for the Taiwanese. First, he/she would need a permit to show his/her entrance in the inner-city area of Shenzhen. Second, if he/she takes a bus to the checkpoint, he/she must get off the bus and hurry to the entrance hall for document checking. After the one-by-one document checking, he/she hastily needs to get on the bus, which waits on the other side of the checkpoint. However, a Taiwanese businessman more easily passes the checkpoint. He does not even need to get off his limousine, and can sit in it while showing his paper to the border guards. While most of Mainland Chinese are examined by border policemen at the checkpoint very carefully, Taiwanese only need to show them their *Taibao* passport and then can easily pass through<sup>6</sup>.

Economical superiority in Taiwanese businessmen makes them stand in a special social status occasionally. Regardless of their shopping routines or visits to local entertainments, Taiwanese businessmen always portrayed the same image: "So long as they were known as Taiwanese businessmen, they were to be well treated". In addition, every Taiwanese businessman knows that the bigger his company is and the more tax he pays to the government, the more respect they receive from Mainland Chinese –

especially from local government officials. However, this kind of treatment and politeness is not reflected in every contact between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese (businessmen), let alone, to be generalized as part of their daily lives. Whenever Taiwanese businessmen talk about passport control between Hong Kong and China, many of them tell unique experience. As one respondent noted:

*"Have you ever been visited by the local Chinese government or passed through passport control? I once passed passport control, a Taiwanese stood in front of me, and he filled 'Taiwan' in the nationality part of the Arrival Card. Did you know how the border controller reacted? His application form was thrown out, and was asked by the controller in a blatant voice to "fill it again". The Taiwanese felt somewhat confused and didn't know what had just happened. I was very curious, so I walked near to him and asked why? When I saw his Arrival Card closely, I realized immediately what the whole thing was about. I then said to him, you must fill "nationality" with "China" – because I experienced this before". (2000, 119)*

Due to the ongoing political conflicts between Taiwan and China, every Taiwanese businessman has to be politically correct in their daily contacts with Mainland Chinese, especially with Chinese officials. As one Taiwanese businessman states, "If one lives under the roof of another person's house, one must obey the rules of the owner" (2000, 112). Even though not every Taiwanese businessman agrees with all Chinese government officials, they always keep a low profile in order to avoid unnecessary troubles, especially regarding sensitive political issues.

A *Taibao* status can sometimes grant Taiwanese businessmen in China a better treatment than the average Chinese citizen, however, this could often be just the opposite. It could be that these kinds of experiences repeat themselves daily in the lives of Taiwanese businessmen and these experiences make them feel that they are always treated differently. As a result, Taiwanese businessmen realize that they are a different social group from other Mainland Chinese.

Nevertheless, most of the Taiwanese businessmen interviewed were unable to name and to describe what kind of benefits are exactly included as a *Taibao*, but after the widely acceptance of this term in their daily communications, a clear distinction between Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese in Chinese society has already been established. Therefore, the term *Taibao* in Chinese Society not only refers to a group of people who are from Taiwan, but also functions as a concept of social classification that emphasizes the fact that a *Taibao* is not equal to a Chinese, or that any Taiwanese in China is not regarded as a Chinese citizen immediately. *Taibao*, therefore, as a mark of a particular social group, is given a special social status in Chinese society.

In addition, the term "Taiwanese businessmen" not only refers to all businessmen that come from Taiwan to China, but it also refers to a group called *Taibao*, which bears a strong social-political dimension. Due to the double meaning of these terms, daily interactions between Taiwanese businessmen and the average Chinese deviates them from a normal Chinese citizen status.

## Work and Leisure

The answer to the question of why Taiwanese businessmen become a unique social group in Chinese society lies not merely in what they experience in their daily lives, but also in their social contacts that are related to their work and leisure.

If there are any close interactions between Taiwanese businessmen and their Mainland Chinese staff, most of them are confined to worker relations. After work, there are only few interactions between Taiwanese businessmen and their Chinese employees. The daily lives in the factory described from the viewpoint of Chinese workers involve only "working and working" (2000, 11). In addition, kitchens in many Taiwanese factories are usually separated between Taiwanese businessmen and managers and the other Chinese employees. Though, in most of the Taiwanese factories, all employees and their Taiwanese superiors live close to each other, but often, the dormitory for Taiwanese businessmen and managers is situated in a different location from that of Chinese employees. Surrounding the dormitory of Taiwanese businessmen, there is usually a high enclosure and a 24-hour security guard. Therefore, despite the long periods of interaction with each other in the same factory, Taiwanese businessmen in Chinese society usually have a completely different lifestyle.

As a result, working and leisure time for many Taiwanese businessmen have two different meanings, but they also relate to different contact groups. The main group that Taiwanese businessmen interact the most with during their leisure time is the group of businessmen that have close business relationships with each other.

During the period I was conducting research in China, I found that most Taiwanese businessmen have regular contacts with their business partners at a fixed place. They would eat in the same restaurant and spend the night at leisure in the same karaoke. For them, this kind of socializing helped them relieve pressure from the daily long working hours at the factory. Utilizing these opportunities for regular contacts, Taiwanese businessmen were also able to exchange important market information. Meanwhile, the "ritualized" dinner parties and karaoke singing played a more important function for Taiwanese businessmen because it brought together Taiwanese businessmen, converting their relationship from loose into close and organizing them into a solid group. The network, therefore, is denser between Taiwanese businessmen.

Some Taiwanese scholars argue that this kind of network of interpersonal relationship is built not only among different Taiwanese businessmen, but also between Taiwanese businessmen and Mainland Chinese officials (Hsing, 1996). This is true when Taiwanese businessmen need to establish closer relationships with local Chinese government officials for allowing their businesses to run smoothly in China. Another China researcher, like Wu (1997), points in contrast that maintaining good relationships with local Chinese government officials is often compulsory for all Taiwanese businessmen investing in China. This is because the Chinese government still relies heavily on interpersonal relationships than on the rules. However, this kind of relationship is hardly equaled to a relationship of friendship. As one respondent told the researcher if a Chinese government official gave Taiwanese businessmen some benefits or privileges, they would think it had little to do with friendship and rather as the official wanting something from them, and conversely. (2000, 121)

Every Taiwanese businessman knows that maintaining a good relationship with government officials is important for their businesses in China. However, from the viewpoint of Taiwanese business people, there are only few Chinese officials who could actually be regarded as core members in the Taiwanese businessmen's network, and do participate in their daily leisure activities without any suspicion of each other.

It is no doubt that this dense network among Taiwanese businessmen has largely contributed to their information exchange with each other and even offers the mutual support for their businesses if necessary. However, in the daily process, such a relation strengthens not only internal coercion within the Taiwanese businessmen, but it is also expressed outward as an in-group and out-group boundary between Taiwanese businessmen and other local Chinese.

### **From "Family Enterprises" to "Family Enterprises without Family"?**

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) built the main force that created Taiwan's "economical miracle" in the past few decades. Many owners of these enterprises were once workers, and they established enterprises through a period of long hours, usually under bad work circumstances but still with high work ethics. This was the scenario in Taiwan's enterprise development process between the 1970s and the 1990s. The successful enterprise chiefs were called by researchers, a group of "Black-hands becoming their own bosses" (Shieh, 1992).

However, since the end of the 1990s, the waves of economic globalization made their business in Taiwan very difficult. Looking for a cheaper working force and low taxes, they moved to China or to other Southeast Asian countries to seek for a new business chance. Many Taiwanese businessmen whom I had contact with during my field research in China were once family enterprises bosses in Taiwan. When asked why these businessmen invested in China and not elsewhere, they usually gave the answer directly that it was for "doing business and making money". As long as their companies in China continued making profits, they choose to stay there. On the other way around, if they were asked about the purpose of making money, they might think the question over and respond, for example, that it was for making their lives better, looking after their families and giving the next generation a better future.

Due to these considerations, many Taiwanese businessmen made great efforts to establish Taiwanese businessmen's elementary schools. Dongquag, one of the most concentrated areas of Taiwanese businessmen in China, was the first location to set up a Taiwanese elementary school for Taiwanese businessmen in 2000. From the viewpoint of Mainland Chinese officials and of secretaries from the Association of Taiwanese businessmen, establishing a Taiwanese school can offer both a school for the children of Taiwanese businessmen and contribute to stabilizing their family lives in China. In addition, if more Taiwanese businessmen let their children become educated in China, it also makes their long-term investment more probable in local Chinese society. From this point of view, establishing a Taiwanese school expresses an indication that Taiwanese businessmen may wish to plant a root in China.



It should be considered that not every respondent agreed with this viewpoint. Most especially, Mainland Chinese employees that were interviewed were against building primary schools exclusively for the children of Taiwanese businessmen. They seemed to fear that the Taiwanese schools would cause serious problems in the younger generation. The children of Taiwanese businessmen would be separately educated from other Chinese children that normally attended public primary schools. As a result, Taiwanese schools would become elite schools without integrating into Chinese society. Taiwanese businessmen "do not trust the education system in China", and therefore, will not let their children be taught by Mainland Chinese teachers, complained a Chinese respondent.

For Taiwanese businessmen, attending a Taiwanese school is a compromised arrangement. Most Taiwanese businessmen think that the best choice for their children is to attend an international primary school. "Every Taiwanese businessman wants to give the best for their children", explained a Taiwanese respondent. The reason why they didn't send their children to an international primary school is mainly because of high tuition fees, which is usually more than 200,000 RMB annually for each child. This is not a small number for most Taiwanese businessmen, not alone for Taiwanese managers. If Taiwanese businessmen let their children attend public primary school, like the average Chinese children, their financial problems can be easily solved. However, many Taiwanese businessmen are worried that different family values are created. A worried Taiwanese respondent expressed, "When we were children, we were educated in Taiwan under the ideology of the Kuomintang, but the children here learn instead the ideology of the communist party. How are we to accept this discrepancy in a family?" (2000, I24). High fees by private schools and the difference in education systems between Taiwan and China are the main reasons why most interviewed Taiwanese businessmen prefer their children to be educated in Taiwan instead of China. Migrating Taiwanese families in China are still small in number because of this option of family arrangement chosen by many Taiwanese businessmen. Although in recent years, the capital of direct investment of Taiwanese businessmen and the number of Taiwanese companies in China are rising.

The main problem confronted by Taiwanese businessmen in China is the problem regarding their families. Their children's education takes only a part in this problem. Even though Taiwanese businessmen can still choose to go home at any time, their social network in Taiwan is getting looser. If their wife and children choose not to migrate, they will live there alone and feel lonely.

Many Taiwanese business people have been to Shenzhen for more than a decade, but they spend, on average, less than two months in a year in Taiwan to see their family. That is to say, they live away from home during the whole year. As a Taiwanese respondent said, "This is almost comparable with see crewmen." (2000, I12)

Long-term employment and investment in China is usually accompanied with sacrifice on family life for Taiwanese businessmen. Many Taiwanese businessmen or managers live alone in the factory or in the area near their investing or working place in China, but their other family members live in Taiwan. This kind of life has led to a special lifestyle of Taiwanese businessmen in China.

*"Our daily life involves only work. You probably cannot imagine how this life looks like because you might stay here just only for a short time. However, we're in a totally different circumstance. We have been here for more than ten years. Usually, we begin the daily work from seven o'clock in the morning and end the work at about nine o'clock in the evening. Every of our Taiwanese cadre must be present in the office during overtime work just like all the rest of the Chinese staff. Around nine o'clock in the evening, we end the work of the day. How should we spend the rest time of the day? Go home? All of us don't have a home here. Chatting with parents, going out for shopping in Carrefour with wife and children or just lying on the sofa and watching TV, etc. – all these simple things in a family seem to a luxury here instead. What kind of leisure activities here we can easily have? It's only karaoke or something similar along those lines. [...] Drinking and making fun everyday might quite interesting, but to be honest, I do not like this lifestyle very much. Rather, I prefer a nightlife that I do feel I'm back to my home." (2000, 113)*

Many Taiwanese entrepreneurs have made great success in their businesses in China, but still causing an unexpected social effect. We have seen many Taiwanese "family enterprises" during their investing in China that have become "enterprises without (original) families". The reason for this change is not because of a transformation from a traditional Taiwanese family enterprise into a modern enterprise that needs not to rely anymore on family-network decisions, therefore, the role of family in Taiwanese enterprises has rapidly declined. But the reason of this change is, in fact, simply because of the daily long-hours of engagement in work and because of the night bar lifestyle, which costs their family life.

Surrounding the gathering point of Taiwanese factories, it is easy to find all kinds of Taiwanese foods and entertainment such as Taiwanese restaurants like "Minced Meat Rice Shop" (滷肉飯專賣店), "Mutton Hot Pot" (羊肉爐), "Pearl Milk Tea" (珍珠奶茶), even "Betel Nut Stand" (檳榔攤), "Shrimp Angling Pond" (釣蝦場), karaoke, bowling alleys, etc. Almost everything that was once popular in Taiwan has been duplicated in China. What the Taiwanese businessmen consume is now also available in any Taiwanese stores where most Taiwanese concentrate. *The Taiwanese way of life* might be a very appropriate term to describe the unique lifestyle of Taiwanese businessmen in Shenzhen. Although, almost all their familiar taste in Taiwan can be found in Shenzhen, there is still one thing that most Taiwanese businessmen in China always miss, namely the feeling of home.

### **Globalization, Transnational Migration and Taiwanese Businessmen**

Economic globalization and the enormous market potential in China have attracted Taiwanese businessmen to invest in China, especially in the city of Shenzhen, which has been declared as the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in China since 1992. Many Taiwanese businessmen follow the old developing model that once made Taiwan's "economic miracle", and they have duplicated this model in Shenzhen with the hope of creating family enterprises' "second offspring". As much of the evidence has been cited above, the successful economical embedded relationship into the

investment location is not necessarily accompanied with Taiwanese businessmen's cultural integration into local Chinese society.

In contrast, a closed network and the many constraints have formed Taiwanese businessmen into a special group in Mainland China. Meanwhile, the shared experiences of *Taibao* let Taiwanese businessmen realize, beyond whichever national identity they might have, that they are not treated the same as the average Chinese citizen (most likely, Taiwanese businessmen are also unwilling to be treated as a *normal* citizen as well). Hence, Taiwanese businessmen with the status of *Taibao* are not only a social group of countrymen, but also an alien group of China.

Indeed, it is very difficult, under the current policy of political correctness in China, to show how different a Chinese identity expressed by the average Chinese citizen is from a Taiwanese businessman. Similarly, under the strong ideology pressure of the civic revulsion against so-called "Pro-Green Taiwanese businessmen" (綠色台商), the identity of a Taiwanese businessman could not be freely expressed in public. If the question of national identity is not treated as a public issue and debated it is no wonder that most Taiwanese businessmen would express their national identity in a more instrumental and strategic way, utilizing national identity for receiving more personal interests, especially in the interactions with Chinese officials. Hence, judging the national identity of Taiwanese businessmen or whether there is an alteration to it, it should not be based on their expressions as a Taiwanese or a Chinese, but instead on their social status treated as an alien group, and the various accompanying identity conflicts.

These identity conflicts are strengthened especially through the altering family types of Taiwanese businessmen in China. On one hand, when Taiwanese businessmen and managers stay more time in China than they do in Taiwan, their networks with their original family and society become looser. On the other hand, although many Taiwanese wish to establish new relationships with local society, their new interpersonal relationships are established for instrumental objectives, and rather are true friendships by nature. In addition, daily interactions with Mainland Chinese usually reveal a sense of remoteness. Due to these reasons, it is less likely to expect that a shared national identity will emerge, although the interactions between the Taiwanese businessmen or managers and local Chinese are rising. The net effect of such a type of migration is that multiple, transnational and sometimes hybrid national identities emerge. They develop a new form of national belonging, which can no longer be classified as "either-or", but rather as "both" or "neither-nor" (Deng, 2008).

### **Future Scenarios regarding the Notion of Belonging and Citizenship**

Does an increase in transnational migration mark the end of national belonging? The answer to this question is complex. The idea of globalization has been linked with the continued liberalization of world trade and the movement of goods, capital and services, and also with a spectacular liberalization of people's free movement (Favell, Feldblum, & Smith, 2006, p.1). There can be no doubt that increasing international mobility is a basic feature of the contemporary world. Nowadays, more people are likely to migrate more frequently like the case of Taiwanese businessmen in Shenzhen

been discussed above. Therefore, mobile people like Taiwanese transnational businessmen are the product of a globalized world, and people themselves becoming the actors. Their notions of belonging and citizenship are often fluid and flexible. Based on this change, what is the future scenario regarding the notion of belonging and citizenship that might be suitable for the future of nation-states? What are the changes we should expect?

Answers may be found by looking at another alternative concept. There are two key components of migration, namely integration and mobility. Merz-benz and Wagner (2002) used these concepts two dimensionally to generate five social types of modern migrants, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Five ideal types of migrants

Note. From *Der Fremde als sozialer Typus* (p.36), by Merz-benz & Wagner, 2002, Konstanz, UVK-Verlag.

Figure 1 shows five ideal types of migrants: *cosmopolitan*, *trader*, *sojourner*, *marginal men* and *local*. A cosmopolitan is a migrant with the most degree of mobility and the least degree of integration ability into local social order. He is the one who can actually go from one job in one country to another job in another country for his entire working life. In comparison with a cosmopolitan, a local person is the one who has the least degree of mobility but with the highest degree of integration ability to local society. The other three types of migrants are *trader*, *sojourner* and *marginal men*, which

are ascribed with possessing either a more or a lesser degree of mobility and integration capability, falling between the type of the cosmopolitan and the local.

According to Merz-benz and Wagner's analysis, I will distinguish three possible future scenarios regarding the notion of belonging and citizenship, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Three future scenarios regarding the notion of belonging and citizenship

**Scenario 1: Territorialized national identities and singular citizenship:** In the age of migration, old national myths are unable to be maintained. However, as many scholars of migration studies have emphasized, nation-state still matters in the future (Zollberg, 1997). National identities and belongings are continually to be significant even if there are different kinds of migrants who cross the national border to seek a better future life more often than before (Smith, 2001, p.3). The increasing global mobility does not spell the end of nation-state. Without nation-state control, the shape of citizenship migration might as well just be people moving around. Therefore, the scenario that everyone should give its loyalty to a specific nation and only have a singular citizenship will still be emphasized. Nevertheless, this kind of scenario might not be the only choice in the contemporary world and in the future. The next question is: which scenarios are the alternatives?

**Scenario 2: Hybrid national identities and "denizenship":** Casteles and Davidson (2000) argue that in the age of globalization, the context for a citizenship based on belonging to a single nation is being eroded. The dramatic increase in transnational

migration challenges the idea of citizenship in traditional nation-states and claims for its change. Let us take the social types in figure 1 into consideration. The social type of trader includes transnational business people, high-flying entrepreneurs and other kind of businessmen who usually cross borders. Modern sojourners indicate the group of temporary migrants including highly-skilled professionals, low-skilled labor migrants, international students, etc. A "marginal man" is defined as a person who lives between two cultures (Park, 1928), and the Jewish ghetto in New York in 1930s was the classical example for describing this kind of people. Nowadays, forced migration like asylum-seekers or exiles might be seen the new social type of marginal man. All these forms of migration build the majority of modern transnational migration. These kinds of people do not have a definite national identity, but hybrid ones instead. A new status for these kinds of people was suggested by Thomas Hammar (1990) with the term Denizenship. Denizen is described by Hammar for people who are foreign citizens with a legal status and permanent resident status (1990, p.15). Denizenship helps transmigrants have the rights to work, seek employment or run a business in a host country with permanent residency (Faist, 2000b, p.203; Castels & Davidson, 2000, p.94). It will create a status for transmigrants in the host society, and it is less than that of a citizen but more than that of a foreigner. Nevertheless, under such arrangement of citizenship, constraints for transmigrants still continue to exist.

**Scenario 3: *Deterritorialized social identities and transnational (dual or multiple) citizenship:*** Another alternative concept about citizenship is provided by several liberal migration theorists such as R. Bauboeck(1993), R. Cohen(1997), S. Casteles and Davidson(2000) and J. Moses(2006). They believe that a future world with free migration brings a significant improvement in the status quo for the majority of people, in both developed and developing worlds (Moses, 2006, p.9). The world is being and will be organized vertically by nation-states, but horizontally by an overlapping, permeable and multiple system of interaction. R. Cohen points out that in the future, there will no longer be any stability in the points of origin, no finality in the points of destination and no necessary coincidence of social and national identities (Cohen, 1997, p.175). Therefore, he claims that territorializing national identities should be replaced with deterritorialized social identities. The cosmopolitans who engage in different kind of cultures might be the prototype of future migration. A step towards a transnational concept of citizenship, i.e. dual- or multinational citizenship, would help the cosmopolitans having a feeling of home in every national culture.

A German urban sociologist indicated that the cities are the places, where aliens live. (Siebel, 1997, p.30). Without aliens, and that is to say without migrants, the formation of any megacity would be impossible. The development of future city culture should reconsider the co-existent relationship between migrants and native people.

Scenario 2 and 3 discussed above provide a solution for mobile people to dissolve the conflict between mobility and integration. These two scenarios suggest that the future of nation-states should recognize the existence of increasing the possibility of membership in two or several countries. Denizenship and transnational citizenship could be not only a solution for engaged cosmopolitans, but also a suitable option for the future of nation-states.

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## Notes

1. The ethnographic work by authors such as Shen Hsiu-Hua (2005) or Wang (2002) on the complex relations among Taiwanese businessmen and their wives and Chinese mistresses as well as on the issue of Taiwanese businessmen's transnational family lives builds a few exceptions in this research field.
2. I choose Shenzhen city because Deng Xiao-ping introduced economic reforms in China and established Shenzhen as the first "Special Economic Zone" (SEZ) in 1992. Since then, huge foreign direct investment capital flows in this small village and changes its face to a mega city with a million population.
3. In theoretical sampling a decision is taken on the basis of previous analysis as to what case should next be included in the investigation. This sampling strategy let maximal possible variation can be sought in the research process. (Flick, von Kardorff, & Steinke, 2004, p. 170)
4. See the debate on "Migration and the Shanghai dream" in: Cultural Studies Monthly 8: Retrieved October 15, 2001, from [http://www.ncu.edu.tw/~eng/csa/journal/journal\\_forum\\_7.htm](http://www.ncu.edu.tw/~eng/csa/journal/journal_forum_7.htm). (Chinese)
5. Taibao passport is a special passport for Taiwanese residents if they travel to China for visiting, work and conducting business, etc.
6. There are 14 checkpoints along the border of inner-city area of Shenzhen (Special Economic Zone). In recent years, the examination of entrance permit to SEZ has greatly changed. There are still border policemen at the checkpoint, but usually almost everyone can easily pass through without showing a permit.

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