

Divided China Stands: The Two Half Chinas Alternative*

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Abstract

With changes across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan and the PRC have calmed their rhetoric, yet neither a peace deal nor a diplomatic truce is in sight. The PRC's nationalism calls for unification while democracy in Taiwan divides political opinion on the island. The study applies Jim Dator's theory for alternative futures and envisions a "two half Chinas" alternative. Both the PRC and the ROC on Taiwan are the remnants of the historical Republic of China established in 1912. The "two half Chinas" alternative would convert the house of the Republic of China into a two-member condominium association.

Keywords: Jim Dator, alternative futures, two half Chinas, sovereignty, nationalism, democracy

Political futurist Jim Dator states in plain language: we are living in the most revolutionary era in human history. In the conclusion of his public talk "What Futures for Governance?" he addressed the audience at Eastern Oregon State University in 1998:

We live in a world where change is changing faster than it ever changed before. Everyday, we are faced with new ideas, new technologies, new organizations, new hopes and new fears.¹

On an earlier occasion, in 1987, Dator warned us in his address "For the Commission on the Future of Virginia's Judicial System":

The world we live in is increasingly one in which no one before has ever lived, and about which past rules and institutions are more, and more rapidly, irrelevant and arguably quite harmful. We may try to stretch and analogize past rules and modify past institutions, but they were not originally designed to deal with today – much less tomorrow. That presents us with a bigger and bigger problem – and opportunity. (emphasis added)

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The system is not falling apart, it has already fallen apart...now industrial society is ending, and if we peer into the future, using our rearview mirror, or even using our analysis of trends, what we see is, in fact – nothing...There is no "future" out there to be seen, to be adjusted to, to be accepted.²

Never has change penetrated so deeply or occurred so rapidly. Moreover, in terms of depth and speed, the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the PRC or Mainland China)³ is currently the world's fastest developing, and most revolutionary, society. While big cities manifest change in the most far-reaching forms, even in remote areas such as Tibet, social, economic, cultural, and political transformation is underway. Each Chinese, including Chinese in the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan or the ROCT) and overseas Chinese of whatever status, now has to cope with constant changes affecting one's thinking and modes of interaction – one's entire way of life. Yet Mainland China's development and its social revolution are only part of the global change, with every nation and people affected in one way or the other.

In his examination of Pentti Malaska's theory of societal change, Finnish futurist Tuomo Kuosa sees that societies are in, or approaching, a period of regenerative growth before a radical new development of society. However, contrary to Malaska's theory of social formation, Mainland China seems unable to recognize the limits of its continued existence (Kuosu 2005). On a scale as large as China's, reality continually disrupts conventional conceptual frameworks and the more or less outdated theoretical speculations with which we endeavor to understand the past and forecast the future. Modernization, according to Ulrich Beck, creates a whole new kind of capitalism, politics, laws, and lives, all of which results in paradigmatic change in modern nation-states that unsettles the world community (Ibid.). In recent years, two features of the political landscape in Mainland China stand out as eminently subversive: (1) Beijing's inflexible stance on national sovereignty, insisting on the absorption of Taiwan into the "motherland" under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and (2) the extraordinary growth of the mainland's economy. Although each has received more than its due of conventional scholarly attention, it is their *joint* reality that has the most significant conceptual and theoretical implications for Futures Studies.

In numerous articles and hundreds of public talks, Dator often started by explaining what is meant by the term "Futures Studies." Back in 1987, Dator made this methodological comment about "the future" and the study of the future: "that which we call, The Future, has three components: (1) There is that which is exactly the same as the past and the present; (2) There is that which is created out of the trends of the past and the present; (3) And there is that which is utterly new" (Dator 1987). Commenting on Dator's talk to the New Zealand Futures Trust Seminar, David Carew stated:

Futures Studies does not attempt to predict the future, nor to engage in wishful thinking or crystal-ball gazing. He (Dator) considered that the term "prediction" should be applied only to aspects of the future that can be foretold very accurately. Rather, he suggested that plural, alternative futures can be forecast, based on an "if – then" perspective that does not attempt to be true but is nonetheless logically consistent. From these alternatives, a "preferred future" should be envi-

sioned and created, not as a blueprint or rail track to be followed blindly, but as a vision, a guiding sense of future direction. (Carew, 2000, pp.3-5)

In his "Futures Studies as Applied Knowledge," Dator elaborated on "What Is Futures Studies" (pp.9-30):

That which we call the future--the present at a later time--is not predictable. If any person says to you: "I know the future. Here it is! Do this!" then run from that person as quickly as possible. The future is not predictable. No one knows with anywhere near sufficient certainty what the future will be. Nonetheless the fundamental unpredictability of the future does not mean that we should therefore not concern ourselves about the future and merely trust in luck, god, or fate; or else to just prepare ourselves to muddle through when new crises suddenly arise. Rather, it means that we need to take a more appropriate stance towards the future than either a search for predictive certainty, leaving it up to fate, or trying only to muddle through.

But what might that "more appropriate stance" be?

First of all, "the future" may be considered as emerging from the interaction of four components: events, trends, images, and actions.⁴

"What Distances, What Chasms Are to be Bridged Here?"⁵

Applying Dator's futures theory to the nation-state and national sovereignty within the Chinese context, is, and will be, shocking to the Chinese. The concept of nation-state and national sovereignty is understandably new to that country. Following John King Fairbank, many Western scholars prefer to use "cultural" rather than any other existing concepts, such as nation-state, to depict China's national ideology. Lucian Pye calls China "a civilization pretending to be a nation-state" (Pye, 1996).

Not surprisingly, the Chinese learned to adapt to a modern world designed and manipulated by the hands of those they used to called "barbarians." However, to their chagrin, now that they are using the Western concept of nation-state to survive the "un-Chinese" world order, they find themselves once again falling behind. The challenge to the "modern" concept of the nation-state from the erosion of its sovereignty is the case in point. Late to embrace the modern notion of nation-state, China suddenly confronts the fact that sovereignty is becoming obsolete. Mainland China, in particular, is stuck in the dilemma of either protecting its national sovereignty or accepting outside intervention. On top of that, as a unique and ever enduring culture, China has been very much backward-looking and takes significantly less interest in the future than the past. Not long ago, China was not expecting anything from the future; instead, the future seemed to have held unexpected and fearful events that again and again devastated the country. Many of China's fears are the result of humiliations imposed by Westerners and nearby neighbors such as the Russians and the Japanese. This explains in part why the Chinese were, and still are, fearful of the future, when just the past one hundred fifty years brought so many tribulations. Only the distant past provides a comfort zone for their hearts.

Any brief review of modern history with a focus on those fearful events would cause China to wrap itself with the glorious distant past and vivid resentment against the recent foreign imperialism (Murphey, 2004). Although China lost extraterritorial privileges and its sovereignty over many territories as early as 1842, its psychical sovereignty as a celestial people and superior culture grew ever stronger. The image of foreigners is still not so different from what one Qing official, Chang Hsi, described in 1842:

You people [British] are born in a form unlike human beings, and what you are doing is unlike what human beings care to do. You kill people everywhere, plunder goods, and act like rascals; that is very disgraceful...You alien barbarians invade our China, your small country attacks our celestial court, how can you say you are not rebellious? (Teng, 1994, p.41)

This pained and paranoid mindset demonstrates the difficulties in changing an ossified mentality. The old China mindset has not died out. While Beck's modernization theory (Kuosa, 2005) asks what new institutions and social categories will take the place of the old, Mainland China's current economic development, from a visible corner of the Chinese society, awakens a need to revive the status of the glorified past (Deng, 2008). China is putting pieces together, both physically and psychologically, to redress historical wrongs. The list of two opium wars; a series of unequal treaties; the bullying wars from neighboring Russia and Japan; the self-righteousness of the United States and its allies; and the enemies of the modern rising China, including separatists in Taiwan, Tibet, and elsewhere, is not just in the history book but in the hearts and minds of the people who claim to be Chinese. It is not known to Westerners, but hundreds of millions of Chinese believe that, since 1839, China has been taken advantage of, abused, repressed, and forcibly removed from its previous position as "The Middle Kingdom of the Earth," first by Western powers, then – even more humiliatingly – by Japan. With such resentments in mind, it is no joke that China's present rise to power is dangerous. It is against this background that the following section addresses the Mainland China-Taiwan conflict from the futuristic point of view.

Adapt or Die⁶

In contrast to Martin Albrows' view of globalization, Dator feels awe before it, using the tsunami as a metaphor, and insists that we either ride it or die of it. According to Albrows, the global age is a wholly different era: it has nothing in common with the old modern era. Despite the widening and deepening generational gap among people whose lifestyle is influenced by technology, nothing is really scary (Albrows, 1997; Kuosa, 2005). Dator confronts such assurances with a provocative social agenda facing the globalization wave:

We must understand that all people are in fact not equal; but that each person is different, unique. People do not wish to be treated as though they are the same. They want to be treated "their way." The Golden Rule is oppressive. Do not "do unto me" according to the way you wish to be done unto, but as I wish to be treated...if life makes sense, has purpose, satisfactions that do not harm or injure oth-

ers – if everyone can win, at least to some real extent, and no one has to lose for good – then crime is almost nil. We know that's the case. So let's create a new society where equity is truly possible and greed is recognized for what it is. (Dator, 1991).⁷

Since "the need for thinking and acting that is explicitly future-oriented is relatively new" (Dator, 1994), Dator's Law about futures studies comes as a surprise: "any useful statement about the future should appear to be ridiculous and to elicit responses of disbelief, shock, horror, or disgust. If you nod your head in agreement about some statement about the future, then forget it. It may be true, but it is not particularly useful to you. What you need to know about the future is what you don't already know, and which you find difficult if not repugnant to hear."⁸ In terms of futures studies methodology, Dator advocates new perspectives so as to "invent the future, and then try to create and maintain it."⁸ In his 2004 book review of *Islam, Postmodernism and Other Futures: A Ziauddin Sardar Reader*, Dator made clear what he expects:

One of the things I try to do is to get my students to consider adopting a "quantum" instead of a "Newtonian" perspective, since the Newtonian concepts upon which the Founding Fathers based their governance system have been recognized for almost a century as being a limited, though still useful, but certainly not sufficient, understanding of the forces and processes of the physical world of which human societies and their governance must be a part.

Alternatively, I urge students who come from nonwestern cultures to try to use cosmologies from their own cultures upon which to base their political design. This might mean crafting modern governance systems on Confucian, or Buddhist, or Hindu, or Hawaiian indigenous cosmologies. (emphasis added)

I ask my students to imagine what contemporary Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu, Indigenous, Islamic, and similar systems of governance might look like if those systems had been able to continue to grow and evolve free either from the taint of western imperialism and colonization, on the one hand, or from internal constraints which froze them at a particular period of history, on the other. (Dator 2004, p.118)

Following his theory, this study intends to approach the Mainland China-Taiwan conflict with an examination of the alternatives for the future. In this approach, it aims to bring the Mainland China-Taiwan conflict out of the Chinese context and further examine it on a global scale within a futures framework.

It is known that Mainland China has been unable to think of its conflict with Taiwan outside of two boxes, box one: the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and box two: its "long desired" goal of a glorified country with dignity. People inside these two boxes share one image, e.g., a great China, with the PRC having complete sovereignty over its territory, to which Taiwan properly belongs. They shoulder a mission in the name of national security, including protection of Taiwan from foreign invasion. For this mission, freedom and liberty are less pertinent than national unity. Any political innovation or institutional infrastructural changes would be harmful to the image of a sovereign China if the political agents are non-Chinese or pro-West. The PRC would be harmed as well. China's elites epitomize pooled characteristics differentiated by

Sohail Inayatullah from political right and left. None of them are visionaries (Inayatullah, 2007).

Dator once asked: "So what do we mean by 'National Sovereignty' any more? Show me one nation that is big enough to control its own destiny" (Dator, 1993). Ten years later, in a public talk at the University of Hawaii, Dator further pointed out that "the concept of the 'sovereign nation-state' is woefully obsolete. More than obsolete, the combination of the concept of 'sovereignty' with the belief that it is permissible, indeed right, for the sovereign state to use deadly force against, as well as in defense, of its citizens is the fundamental cause of our problems" (Dator, 2003).

Traditional notions of sovereignty are evolving. While respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of states presently remains fundamental to the stability of the global system, globalization and the increased transparency of borders associated with it will require nations to adapt to these changing circumstances. The concept of sovereignty, which has been the major issue affecting Mainland China-Taiwan relations for more than half a century, is in need of alteration. Regional and global stability depends on a peaceful resolution of cross-strait tensions.

Based on Dator's theory of the nation-state, according to which "the nation-state is virtually dead,"⁹ China should embrace the "global society" that people across the Taiwan Strait live in because the Chinese "seem progressively unable to cope with the many global problems they increasingly face" (Dator, 1998). Furthermore, Dator reminds us:

I am also impressed by the breakdown of large nation-states, and the creation of smaller ones, which I see going on everywhere in the world, except the US...As I say, this disintegration and re-unification of old and new nation-states is a global process, augmented by the technological, economic, environmental and demographic/cultural processes I have already touched upon. Moreover, I believe that the widening chasm between the peoples of the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres will replace the East-West, communism-capitalism preoccupation of the post-World War Two period. And the North itself will more clearly be divided into three regions, in order of priority: East Asia, Greater Europe, and North America.

The "Pacific Century" looms, dominated – by whom? Japan? Perhaps. More likely China with nearly 1/3 of the world's bloated population not only on its very diverse mainland and across the straits in prosperous Taiwan but also, as so-called "Overseas Chinese," spread worldwide, and soon, perhaps to embrace the other Confucian powers – the reunited Koreans, Singapore, perhaps even a subdued Japan itself. (Dator, 1993, p.21)

To the nationalistic Chinese, it seems absolutely ridiculous, absurd, and very dangerous for anyone to voice statements such as "forget sovereignty over Taiwan." Thus, as one futures alternative, this study seeks to reverse the backward-looking mentality described in the previous section to a futures-oriented approach, so that Mainland China is able to see what alternative futures could look like. In this way, Beijing's taboo on Taipei's sovereignty will be ridiculed rather than worshipped. In another words, the hunter shall be hunted for his own sake. Dator reminds us that "the

crying need of the immediate future is for new forms of global governance which can deal effectively, fairly, and hopefully democratically with the globalization of everything else" (Ibid.). Confronting this crying need in the form of tsunamis that are approaching us from the future, the following discussion will focus on the peaceful sovereignty division theory (PSDT) in advocating the "two half Chinas" alternative to accommodate the impact of global change upon national sovereignty within the Mainland China-Taiwan context.¹⁰

Two Half Chinas

The PRC embraces as its righteous mission maintaining its territorial integrity and national security. As an authoritarian state, it views its sovereignty and related global issues primarily from its domestic political goals. The Beijing government, in various white papers, emphasizes the paramount role of sovereignty in protecting its national dignity. With historic colonial impositions in mind, sovereignty is viewed as the foundation from which to resist Western encroachment. Its ongoing political conflicts with Taiwan, Tibet, and Islamic ethnic groups in Xinjiang loom especially large among the factors shaping its domestic policies. The PRC has taken a hard line, allowing no room for any compromise on its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. The Mainland Chinese people and their political elites alike firmly believe that the implications of Taiwan's independence are unimaginably dangerous. To them, Taiwan's permanent separation would signify nothing but a lead domino in the dissolution of mother China. In other words, if Taiwan is allowed to remain separate indefinitely, this will set an example for potentially rebellious parts of China such as Tibet, Xinjiang, perhaps Inner Mongolia, and even Hong Kong. That is to say, Taiwan's future as a part of China is perceived to be inseparable from the integrity of a unified Chinese state. Tom Plate points out that the Chinese military is ready to "Saddamise" any effort in that direction.¹¹

The conflict between Mainland China and Taiwan may continue for some time. However, the future exceeds our present hopes. While the man of the mainland acts like a 21st century two-legged cave-dweller, striding with one leg towards the glorified past while the other stands idly on his sovereign land, the world is tangoing out of its shadow. In 1998, Dator cautioned:

Given the present and the looming future, we must neither romanticize the past nor trivialize the future. We are going to have to do some very new things, to have viable communities in the future, and not try to restore past ways that were relevant for past situations but not for the lives of most people now, and for almost no one tomorrow.¹²

The realities between Taiwan and Mainland China are economically hot, but politically cold. For both parties, being Chinese is their greatest strength: nothing matters more. Following Inayatullah's strategy, the first step toward ending the stalemate is to come up with a shared collective vision. The second is the big picture work (Inayatullah, 2007). The peaceful sovereignty division theory directs the philosophy of yin and yang towards history and alternative futures. This theoretical framework

intends to construct a shared vision in order to overcome the current deadlock. Let the following observations serve to suggest a way forward:

1. Since the PRC has never exercised its jurisdiction on the island of Taiwan or implemented any foreign policy involving or obligating in any way the inhabitants of Taiwan, it has no sovereignty over Taiwan.
2. Since the ROCT is functional, its claim to statehood based on popular sovereignty stands.
3. Since the PRC insists on its sovereignty over Taiwan, while the ROCT remains a *de facto* nation-state, a divided China is a political reality.
4. Since neither the PRC nor the ROCT represents all people of Chinese origin, China remains an elusive reality that transcends present boundaries.

Hypothetically, it would seem rational that the PRC acknowledge the ROCT as a sovereign government on the island of Taiwan. To be specific, if the PRC's concept of sovereignty can be relaxed, two options for an alternative solution can be entertained. Option one: with the PRC's concession, Beijing and Taipei could accept the notion that sovereignty can be shared. Within such a futuristic framework, one China is to survive in two sovereign governments. One is the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, which will continue to enjoy its jurisdiction over the island; the other is the People's Republic of China, which will continue to exercise its sovereignty over the mainland. In this scenario, Taiwan does not belong to the PRC but to China, whose sovereignty is shared by two governments. While the name of "Taiwan" as a substitute for the "ROCT" is used in international affairs, Taiwan would enjoy sovereign status, just as the PRC would, thus leaving no room for an international acknowledgement of the Republic of Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as the ROT), a new state that Taiwan's Democratic Progress Party (DPP) is striving to establish. Option two: with concessions from Beijing and Taipei, each should shrink to half China status. In this second scenario, the original Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the ROC), established in 1912, from which the PRC divorced itself in 1949 and the ROCT is trying to extricate itself, should accept the ROC's overarching sovereignty. Despite the PRC's half-century rivalry with the ROCT, neither of the two could have been born without the historical existence of the Republic of China, the first republic in China's 3,500 years of written history. This option suggests that the ROC holds complete sovereignty, which is shared by two "half Chinas," respectively; one is on the mainland and called the "People's Republic of China," the other is on Taiwan and called "Taiwan." These two "half Chinas" constitute one country under the title of Republic of China. It is a historical China that included the mainland and Taiwan before 1949 and a modern China with two "half Chinas" residing separately on the mainland and Taiwan. Each of the "half Chinas" has its share of the sovereignty that belongs to this historical and modern Republic of China.

Divided China Stands

The current ROCT government under Ma Ying-jeou seemingly departs from the DPP's rhetoric of pursuing eventual independence from the PRC. The Ma Ying-jeou government is set to improve relations with the PRC and seeks an international cli-

mate more favorable to the island, especially in the midst of a deep global financial crisis. However, the ROCT also makes clear that Taiwan is not about to sail its sovereignty to the other shore of the Taiwan Strait. From the perspective of Taiwan, it is an article of faith that Beijing has no legal jurisdiction over Taiwan. The following statement made by Lee Denghui in 1998 still reflects the thinking of the majority in Taiwan:

*The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present reality by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And that reality is that China is divided, just as Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today. Hence, there is no "one China" now. We hope for this outcome in the future, but presently it does not exist. Today, there is only "one divided China," with Taiwan and the mainland each being part of China. Because neither has jurisdiction over the other, neither can represent the other, much less all of China.*¹³

Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has undertaken a radical transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The democratization process has produced major changes in the island political system. These changes hold significant implications for the content and direction of its policies. Democracy has brought about multi-party politics, and it has become a driving force behind Taiwan's policy toward the mainland. Taiwan's democracy has, since its birth, enhanced the legitimacy of Taiwan's political independence and discredited the PRC's claim over the island. At the same time, since democracy is a force of change, political maneuverings may keep options open for different alternatives.

What of an ROT Choice?

The DPP made it clear that they are not interested in uniting with Mainland China and will go as far as to establish a new nation. This nation would be the Republic of Taiwan, the ROT. However, by establishing Taiwan as the ROT, Taiwan would lose a lot of the political leverage it has in the world. This is due to historical factors surrounding the fate of the Republic of China. Under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership from 1928 to 1975, the ROC relocated its government to Taiwan in 1949. On the mainland the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 by the CCP under Mao Zedong's leadership. The ROC on Taiwan was continuously recognized internationally as the sole sovereign Chinese state (including the mainland) until the late 1970s, when the PRC – denied recognition as a sovereign state until then--replaced the ROC in the UN Security Council. The PRC insists that the ROC be called "Taiwan, China." While the PRC refers to the ROCT as "Taiwan, China," the international community regards it simply as "Taiwan." Following the gradual name changes from the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek, to the ROCT under Chiang Ching-kuo (1978-1988), to "Taiwan, China," under Lee Denghui (1988-2000), most countries have shifted from formal to informal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. If the Republic of Taiwan were created in the future, many nations would be in a bind since they have had relations with the ROC on Taiwan, not with a newly established ROT. More importantly, the PRC will not allow the nations of the world to recognize a Republic of Taiwan that divorces itself from China. Confronted with Beijing's opposition, nations likely would "pledge allegiance"

(politically) to the PRC and leave the ROT out in the cold. With this choice Taiwan would be left politically isolated, but, with a weakening economy, it can ill afford to break off its economic relations with the mainland. Thus, if Taiwan continued its movement towards independence as the ROT, it would fail to establish an internationally recognized state.

What if the PRC Backs Off?

If Taiwan were to declare sovereignty, that is, to transform itself from "Taiwan, China," into the "Republic of Taiwan," and the PRC ignored it, the world would not only be shocked but would also question Beijing's commitment to its policy statements. Under such circumstances, one could imagine that some nations would immediately establish diplomatic relations with the ROT. With Taiwan being a democratic nation, it would be easier for other nations to deal with it than with the PRC, which still openly claims to be a communist state headed by a highly centralized government. Though the PRC would lose face, economically it would remain a growing powerhouse and continue to build its resources. This option does not hold the severe consequences that the other one does, but few would expect the PRC to stand by idly if Taiwan declares its sovereignty and moves to establish its independence as the ROT.

"Which Way Do We Travel?"¹⁴ A Conclusion

What does it mean to "share sovereignty?" To share sovereignty means that a nation, though having power over its own territory, must consider the interests of other territories when deciding national and international policy. Sharing sovereignty under the peaceful sovereignty division approach, both Taiwan and Mainland China would benefit from establishing a joint council of diplomatic ambassadors that would represent the best interests of the people on both sides of the Strait. The "one China" policy will be maintained because the government of the PRC would never agree to any other policy. However, Taiwan could agree to a policy that allows it to increase its diplomatic representation in the international community. The interests of the peoples facing each other across the strait can best be protected and assured in a two-government system with joint diplomatic representatives to the international community, for example, to the United Nations. By sharing sovereignty both states will continue their trade, which is very important economically for Taiwan, being the fourth largest investor in Mainland China, with a stake of roughly US \$40 billion. It is also in Beijing's best interest to keep Taiwan economically interested in the mainland. Currently, the PRC is looking to solidify its position in the world market and strengthen its economy, which in turn will no doubt help it gain favorable trading status with other nations. However, despite the fact that Mainland China's economy with its 1.3 billion people receives far more attention than does Taiwan's with 23 million, it intends to keep a short leash on the island while remaining open for Taiwanese business. It seems that the harder the PRC pushes Taiwan, the greater the separation. Eventually this will lead the PRC to make one of two choices; either hold true to their word that they will use military force against Taiwan or simply let the island nation go. Most likely, in order not to lose face by going back on their word, they would attack Taiwan. Ironically, that

would result in Beijing's losing face before the international community. The PRC has placed itself in a lose-lose-win situation, with the third option (win) being shared sovereignty. Should Mainland China attack, which many people expect, without allies, Taiwan would be crushed. Consequently, such an attack by the PRC would lead to an even larger conflict, as the US and other democratic nations could be expected to come to Taiwan's aid. This is not a very likely scenario, though, since Beijing is not interested in expending a great deal of resources on a war spawned by ideology.

The benefits of sharing sovereignty are innumerable and should seriously be considered by Taiwan and Mainland China. First of all, it would allow for each of their economies to develop, giving them more influence over the politics of Asia. A consolidated effort by Mainland China and Taiwan would allow them to have vast political and economical power in Asia. With Japan's economy suffering the worst crisis since WWII and India far from attaining China's level of success, there are no real competitors to the Chinese in Asia. With strong economies, Mainland China and Taiwan would extend their spheres of influence from Asia to the world. No longer would other countries be able to set policy; rather, the Chinese will be the ones setting the world's economic agenda. When economics is involved, politics is right behind. Many of the world's prominent actors would have to take into account Chinese interests when making choices on the international level.

Though it differs from many other theories, the peaceful sovereignty division theory draws on important points from other workable theories. The major difference of this theory from others is that the "two half Chinas" approach does not cut reality off from historical factors. It intends to awaken both Mainland China and Taiwan to be on alert for an emerging reality "in which no one before has ever lived, and about which past rules and institutions are more, and more rapidly, irrelevant and arguably quite harmful."¹⁵ Moreover, the emerging reality in the near future may be neither a unity between Mainland China and Taiwan nor a permanent separation across the Taiwan Strait. Oncoming tsunamis will force both the mainland and Taiwan to embrace a future in which the mainland's taboo on Taiwan's sovereignty is abandoned and the democracy on Taiwan is contested. A true democracy in the future "global society" will be only "an ideal, or a futuristic form of governance...and rule by the people."¹⁶ The altered position on the issue of sovereignty with the "two half Chinas" alternative model will settle, not just end, the hostility across the Taiwan Strait. In other words, the time of the deadlocked dilemma, either for the PRC and Taiwan to be united (that two be one China) or for them to remain divided (that two not be one China) is passing. The future beckons.

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Notes

1. Dator, "What Futures for Governance?" Public Lecture Series, Eastern Oregon State University, LaGrange, Oregon, May 28, 1998.
2. Dator's public talk "For The Commission On The Future Of Virginia's Judicial System," Richmond, Virginia, November 4, 1987.
3. While a single word "China" is used, it refers to a special concept (entity) including the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the Chinese Mainland, or the China in its historical concept. The term "Chinese" refers to all people of Chinese origin despite of their political affiliations or the differences of their citizenship.
4. Dator indicated that the paper "Futures Studies As Applied Knowledge" is derived from one originally prepared for the First World Futures-Creating Seminar "Renewing Community as Sustainable Global Village," organized by Prof. Kaoru Yamaguchi, August 16-19, 1993. Goshiki-cho, Awaji Island, Japan.
5. One of the passages composed by RACTER. According to Dator, "RACTER is a computer program, developed by William Chamberlain in the 1970s, which randomly generated sentences on the basis of a few grammatical rules and a stock of words." In his article "What's Un-Common About Comm-unities? Past, Present, And Future," Dator discussed the important issue on the "futures of communities." With regards to China's future community, he said "We should anticipate that Japan, China, India, Brazil and other nations will become much more active in space exploration and settlement in the 21st Century. They may establish communities with very different cultures and expectations from those NASA might have in mind." The author re-quotes the RACTER passages and uses them as section headings in this paper.
6. A phrase from Dator's talk entitled "When Crime Doesn't Pay-Enough" for the 1991 Safety Action Seminar sponsored by the Department of the Attorney General, State of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 21, 1991.
7. A quotation from Jim Dator's talk entitled "When Crime Doesn't Pay-Enough" for the 1991 Safety Action Seminar sponsored by the Department of the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii in Honolulu on October 21, 1991. <http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/dator/courts/crimedontpay.pdf>
8. Dator, "As If I Virtually Said This to Pepsi Executives during a Futures Discussion at their Headquarters." Somer, New York, January 31, 1997.
9. Dator first put "invent, create and maintain" in his futures theory on January 13, 1995 when he addressed the session on "Technology, Ethics, and the Man-Made Environment at the International Conference on Development, Ethics, and the Environment in Kuala Lumpur of Malaysia." The title of his talk was "Coming, Ready Or Not: The World We Are Leaving Future Generations, And Our Responsibility Towards Them."
10. Dator addressed the panel on "Future Relations with Japan" at the Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii on December 4, 1991. The title of his talk was "Forget Pearl Harbor! Remember The Maine!"

11. The present author has developed this theory elsewhere.
12. Tom Plate, "Don't Bet Against China Going to War Over Taiwan." *The Strait Times*. April 10, 2004. In this article, Plate says, "China fears that Mr. Chen is the lead domino in the dissolution of mother China. Thus, the PLA wants to 'Saddamise' it. Under these circumstances, and with such historic stakes, it's easy to imagine why China would exercise the military option against Taiwan." <http://taiwansecurity.org/>
13. Dator talked to the Panel "Visioning Future Communities" for the Evolving Faces of Future Communities Conference in Texas on April 24, 1998.
14. *Central News Agency*, Taiwan, August 4, 1998, translated by the present author.
15. See note 5 above.
16. Dator's public talk "For the Commission on the Future of Virginia's Judicial System." op. cit.
17. Dator addressed the Communications Working Group at the XII World Conference of World Futures Studies Federation , Barcelona, Catalonia, September 1991. The title of his address was "I Want MY ITV."

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