

Screenplay As Scenario Vehicle: Unpacking the Implications of Korean Unification in an Asian Remake of "A Clockwork Orange"

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Abstract

Scenario writing is a useful research method in futures studies. Expertly informed scenarios can be used to identify, forecast and model outcomes for complex issues or situations. They have the capacity to provide awareness of potential "wild card" or "Black Swan" contingencies to issues and policy responses that would otherwise be overlooked in more conventional analyses. They also have significant influence on public attitudes when presented in literary or cinematic form.

This work is focused on opening a discussion on integration policy options in Korea, but may have applications beyond strictly the Korean context. Variations on this template might be applied to responses to alienated youth be they "thugs", gang members and child-soldiers that are now and continue to be extant in other regions all over the world.

Keywords: Korea, Korean Unification, Korean Reunification, Scenario Writing, Screenplays, Futures Forecasting, National Integration, Social Integration Policy, Youth Alienation, A Clockwork Orange

Introduction: A Primer on the Problem Korean Unification

When you hear about starvation in North Korea, a lot of very level-headed people think, "There is no way a country like that can survive." Well, I can guarantee you this: I'm here to tell you with absolute certainty those guys will tough it out for centuries just the way they are. Neither the United States nor any other country is going to be able to force a collapse of that government in North Korea.

Eason Jordan, president, CNN International Networks, in a lecture at Harvard University, March 10, 1999, reporting on nine visits to North Korea. (Harrison, 2002)

I am your humble narrator ten years into my jihad. Back before nothing but zombie. Me a soul you promised, but it nothing was. That thing you lied in your probing and poisoning and shocking and making other desires. A promise you never keep. So now you pierce my skin and my thoughts turn me orange. You hotballed against me. It my destiny is to lose my being lost.¹

Dolan, Timothy (2011). *Ahn's Manefesto Pretitle Zombie Orange* (screenplay).

There is no evidence of a pending North Korean collapse, or rather, no additional evidence. Because of this a North Korean collapse may be imminent. This is because it has the classic traits of a "Black Swan" event; an outlier, not anticipated or heretofore experienced in the normative world. (Taleb, 2007) While there is a perennial presumption of Korean unification, the division persists ironically because the respective visions of how unification might proceed are utterly incompatible with each other. While history would seem to favor the economically robust South prevailing in absorbing North Korea at some point, the sheer will of the North Korean regime in maintaining a consistent identity as being a people apart, both literally and figuratively, seems to have ossified into true stalemate.

To most observers, North Korea's persistence is remarkable and unfathomable. The North Korean world view has become the most backward looking in the world while South Korea embraces at least the trappings of things to come (like the next boy or girl band). Consider this passage from Reynolds (2010) regarding North Korean television content:

Rather than try to stimulate curiosity about what will happen next, directors and writers try to make one wonder what has already happened. Films introduce characters in a certain situation (getting a medal, say), then go back and forth in time to explain how they got there. Nowhere in the world do writers make such heavy use of the flashback.

Movement towards reunification thus has a tectonic quality with windows of opportunity marked generationally as Kim Il Sung v.3 is being prepared for rollout. The preferred official future for Korea reunification presumes to follow the East-West Germany template, but for this scenario to move become manifest it would require a Gorbachev figure with a clear-eyed assessment of current conditions and long-term future prospects. This is not how the vast majority of regimes behave. Call it the "Emperor's New Clothes" effect of true believers reinforcing each others world view.

In this the new regent Kim Jong-un seems very much his father's son. (Fujimoto, 2004)

That said, state collapse is notoriously hard to predict. Despot expiration indicators tend to pop-up only after their goose is cooked. From the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and East Germany, to regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen; none were seen as particularly at-risk at the beginning of the years in which their decades-long rulers fell.

Korean unification is likewise not likely to follow any kind of timetable. The single most plausible precipitating condition would be popular delegitimization, but such shifts sweep in unannounced. It is a testament to (or indictment of) the thrall of the rulers of Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that no such delegitimization has yet reached anything close critical mass. It may take more than DVDs of South Korean dramas with their idealized settings of affluence and style smuggled in from China to set them off.

This has not stopped rather anticipatory rhetoric by no less a figure than South Korea's Lee Myung-bak, who proposed a "reunification tax" in a 2010 speech to the nation on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan. This proposal by a hardliner President was announced even as the sinking of a South Korean warship "Cheonan" presumably by North Korea, was still fresh in the public memory. The bold proposal made nominally more sense when placed in a context of the two previous "liberal" administrations forbidding discussions of North Korean contingencies in South Korea and with American diplomats because of their fear of provoking North Korea.²

Interestingly polls on the tax proposal revealed the cognitive dissonance carried by South Koreans about unification with the North.


Reunification is highly desirable and appealing to both Koreas, yet the jaw-dropping cost of reunifying the two countries has made the ROK and the majority of its citizens hesitate. A recent poll in 2009 showed that more than **80% of South Koreans** wanted reunification, **but less than 19%** wanted a reunification within their generation in fear of economic consequences. Moreover, the culture of both side's Koreans has drifted far apart since 1948 leading to fears that the North Koreans will not be able to integrate into a 21st century, Korean society which would create widespread social problems.³

The contradiction between seeking unification and hesitation over paying for it is not too surprising given the unnatural division of the country and the now generations long estrangement. Talk of reunification is thus both rhetorical parlor game and the stuff of ongoing contingency planning at the highest levels of government complicated by growing popular recognition of and unease over the consequences of unification along the lines of costs and social disruption. In a culture that highly values social harmony these become significant considerations.

Inoguchi, 2001 posits 3 scenarios for unification; the Westphalian (state-centric) scenario which is largely a status-quo scenario of the two-states that may or may not draw together in some undetermined future which is somewhat analegeous to China and Taiwan; the Philadelphian scenario, a move towards a North/South confederation

that has been suggested by the North, but made unacceptably conditional on the withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula; and the Anti-Utopian scenario of a failed state (presumably North Korea) leading to collapse and/or overthrow a la East-West Germany. This last scenario is the preferred course by the U.S., or at least as interpreted by Inoguchi. These scenarios are broadly drawn and don't depart from the perspectives already widely held by the stakeholders. Most non-Korean and non-American observers see the matters in Westphalian terms including the Russians and Chinese largely for their own strategic purposes, North Korea holds the Philadelphian confederation view, while the South Korean and American administrations maintain the Anti-Utopian scenario.

The "dream" of unification has waxed and waned over the decades. One means of tracking salience is by means of the Google Ngram Viewer which sorts the frequency of key words from the book titles in the Google Books database, an ongoing compilation now at about 15,000,000 volumes.⁴ Two significant caveats concerning the figure below: The titles referenced are in the English language and not in Korean; and only reflect book titles which may no longer accurately reflect the aggregate literature on the issue.



(Normalized by books published each year 1950 to 2008).⁵

Figure 1. Percentage of all English language books with "Korean Unification" or "Reunification" in their titles by year.

*Figures on the Y-axis are percentages of all books published over the years referenced in the Guttenberg Project's digitized books archives. The figures shown are blurry, due to the graphics formatting of the Ngram Viewer copied and pasted into this work and cannot be sharpened.

The unification of Yemen might be a closer model to the Korean scenario than the German case with the State Socialist Southern "Peoples Republic of Yemen" agreeing to join the Northern Republic of Yemen in 1990. The new state fell into civil war in 1994 and has subsequently been unstable ever since with a popular uprising underway

at the time of this writing.⁶ Any comparisons of the Yemeni case to the Koreas is difficult beyond the fact of South Yemen being ideologically state socialist and North Yemen having a nominally a free-market economy and both states being ethnically homogeneous. However, while ethnically the same, both North and South Yeman are tribal societies, and as such have a diminished sense of common national identity. Both states were impoverished and neither had developed any democratic institutions. Still, the case is instructive for underscoring the difficulties of achieving effective reunification.

The attempt at politically led reunification in Yemen ultimately led to the forced absorption of the South by the North. This is often seen as the only other alternative in Korea and the one still being pursued by the North. However, as witnessed in Gulf War I, American led international intervention would be guaranteed, at least for its strategic allies. Kuwait was, for instance, "liberated" from Iraqi intervention without any formal defense pact in place.⁷ South Korea's relationship with the United States is so much more than the nakedly strategic one that connected the U.S. to Kuwait. The American military remains a primary deterrent force with about 28,000 troops stationed in country; their presence formally extended from 2012 to 2015 thanks to the 2010 Cheonan sinking (Carden, 2010). So the stalemate on the Korean peninsula continues without resolution punctuated by incidents, debates and especially in the military sphere, contingency planning (Stares, 2010). Even with recent bi-lateral talks, the South's insistence that the North denuclearize before any talk of integration at any level, let alone unification, can proceed; is unlikely to happen. The nuclear option is the North's one remaining ace in the hole.

History seems to be moving against Korean reunification. Other than the cases of Germany, and Yemen the global trend has been something of a one-two punch against the nation-state system generally.⁸ There was, of course, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which, to be honest, was more an abandonment of an anachronistic throwback to the days of empire. There was also the violent break of Bangladesh from Pakistan, the more amicable divorce of the Czechs and the Slovaks, and the horrendously bloody cases of Yugoslavia's demise and the latest case of Sudan splitting into North and South. Even the United Kingdom is less formally "united" with political autonomy granted to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Finally there is countervailing the rise of supranational entities like the IMF/World Bank, NATO, and several species of economic unions that have had the effect of limiting national sovereignty thus challenging the classical nation-state model entirely.

A final factor working against unification is that, while Korea is a highly homogeneous nation with a long history of ethnic and linguistic national identity, the bulk of its history has been one of political division. There is thus a contradiction between attaining a unified Korea and its own historical experience as a civilization. In this we see a parallel between their experience and that of Ireland; in the latter case, a fully insular nation still undergoing a grudging consensus acceptance of its divided status. Such dreams persist when they are woven into a narrative of national identity and as such we can expect ongoing movements toward realizing the goal of reunification. It is worth noting that the bloodiest wars are civil wars among homogeneous peoples. The Tai Ping Rebellion and the suigenocide of the Khmer Rouge come quickly to

mind. This need not be some surrender to any prospect of a reunified Korea, though the time horizon is such that when such an outcome is realized a complete reimagining of what nation as nation-state is might render it as something quite different than how it is currently conceived.

And yet there is still the low-probability yet high impact prospect of a Black Swan reunification. What follows is an attempt to introduce a new tool to provide a better means to grasp and more clearly appreciate the social consequences of a post-reunification Korea. It is frankly more literary device than formal analytical tool, but it has great utility; revealing, in dramatic fashion, how ill-equipped the Koreas might be in bringing social as well as political reunification.

Strategic Planning Approaches to Korean Unification

Grant (2003) provides a review of the two schools of thought regarding strategic planning; the rational design and the organizational emergence approaches. Here these two approaches are briefly reviewed.

The relatively more established and conventional rational design school aligns well culturally with Korean organizational design in that it is centrally orchestrated and informed by formal specialized teams charged with the planning process deemed expert by the executive strata. It can be characterized as an engineering approach to planning. The very fact of a Ministry of Unification in South Korea speaks to the embrace of a formal institutional approach.⁹ Without going into detail, the Ministry of Reunification consists of an office for planning and coordination, three bureaus for unification policy, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, and a humanitarian cooperation. There is also a special bureau for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and five affiliated agencies on unification education, inter-Korean dialogue, transit between South and North, settlement support for displaced North Koreans and an office for inter-Korean consultations on exchanges and cooperation. This review of the Ministry's organization speaks to its formal makeup consistent with the rational design model. This model clearly designates the Ministry of Reunification as not only the lead agency but the de facto sole authority within the government on reunification matters. To the extent any policy moves forward on reunification it moves via this Ministry with nominal consultation outside of itself.

The organizational emergence model is typified as more ad-hoc in approach, less formalized, less hierarchical, more flexible, project oriented and consultative. Planning is not relegated to a specific department, though there may be an office for organizing, orchestrating, and assembling information for internal and external dissemination. Participation is elicited throughout in a "bottom up" manner, but usually with emphasis on input from the managerial levels. Because of its more ad hoc and issue-centered characteristics it has been favored as a better means of navigating in turbulent and volatile environments. As an ad hoc approach it eschews designated planning cycles and 5-year plan creation in favor of dynamic process implementation and evaluation with tighter feedback loops to expedite decision-making. As the name implies the emphasis is on process and not on structure. It does not presume that future conditions are going to be essentially the same as the present. Given that

Korean unification is unlikely to occur under static circumstances, this mode of planning might make more sense. The organizational emergence model is thus a more conducive environment for opening contingencies that extend beyond the unification event. This is where scenario building may be effective in informing post-unification process.

Scenario as Method

A technique favored by those within the emergent process school includes scenario building; a more difficult and time-consuming process than is commonly appreciated. It is a fairly evolved technique in military organizations as well as in some corporations such as Royal Dutch Shell and Exxon (Grant, 2003). Game simulations, including computer aided, desktop and field exercises are applied species of scenarios. There also are manifest in literary genres, especially fables, alternative history, and science fiction. Scenario building usually develops from a premise; a "what if" question that then incorporates relevant variables into a cause-and-effect chain of informed speculation leading either to a culminating outcome, or to a key decision point.

Scenarios are by their nature integrative and not analytical. As such they are favored by generalists. Specialists can often be myopic when it comes to applying their models to the complexities of the real world. This is why microeconomists aren't the best investors. Because of their integrative capacity they are useful as means of testing the effects of, for instance new policies or policy variations that are being considered for enactment.

What follows is an example of a scenario that addresses a part of the social dimension of Korean unification in a novel way. It is derived from a screenplay written initially as an Asian remake of *A Clockwork Orange*, a novel written by Anthony Burgess in 1962, which explored a dystopian British future in which a violent gang leader's crimes, capture and treatment is told in first-person narrative. In this instance, the template is applied to a post-unification Korea. This story is thus intended to present a larger challenge that is likely to confront Korean society including perhaps a confrontation with the Korean cultural traits of paternalism, and conformity. The use of behavioral modification techniques including a mix of drug and surgically augmented aversion therapies is plausible given the magnitude of the traumatic collapse, not just of regime, but of the entire North Korean world view. True to its screenplay template it is naturally organized into scenes. Each scene will be summarized here around the overarching question of what a post-unification Korea might have to do in relation to large numbers of young North Korean men who are likely to be marginalized without substantial intervention. That this entire screenplay/scenario is set in the future happens to render it safe for opening thought and discussion in a way that would otherwise be fraught with emotion if not passion. This was an often-used device by Soviet-era Eastern Europeans to speak of current social issues without running afoul party censors. In this screenplay, as in the book, an exotic slang is used to produce another distancing effect, entirely plausible given the quickly evolving nature of contemporary language globally. This aspect will not be taken up here in favor of concentrating on the scenario technique and its application to the question at-hand.

Pre-title Shot: Ahn's Manifesto

This is the opening portion imagined as a figure sitting in silhouette. Fireworks effects denote the after-effects of treatment. Flashes emanate silently. Clouds obscure emanations. Flashes occur about every second or so suggesting intense thought. Ahn, the protagonist, speaks in absolutely calm tones though is raving in something of a Shakespearean tone. It is reminiscent of the well-modulated video messages of Osama Bin Laden. His manifesto includes the lines:

Probing of fun, but you and poisoning and shock, and production and suppression of desire, that something else came. We found our way, we can not find the way.

This is Konglish. It is created by writing first in English, translating into Korean and then translating back into English using Google Translate. Korean happens to be notoriously difficult to machine translate into English. The result may be difficult to comprehend in English, but Koreans can make out this syntax more comfortably. In translation his ravings are at once incomprehensible yet compelling; creating an ambiguous and ambivalent mixture of madness and prophecy and suggesting enlightenment out of torture; a clear reference, for those in the know, to the Buddhist first principle of existence as suffering. In this he also echoes the symptoms of psychopathy. (Ronson, 2011). One is unsure of his being a crackpot or a messiah. This ambiguity is a trait of prophets generally.

Scene 1 – establishing characters

There are 5 members of the gang; Ahn (Ironically a word that can mean "peace" in Chinese) the leader, Abadaba (a corruption of "Abracadabra" for his dexterity in opening locks), who is half Chinese and a growing rival to Ahn, Jiro (Zero) who is effeminate and is used as bait by the gang in robberies, Bui (a Korean rendering of the letter "V" as in violent) who is essentially a homicidal maniac, and Mung Mung (a dog's barking sound in Korean) who is the oldest and largest; a slow witted and sweet member generally used as a lookout he has no taste nor talent for violence despite his size. All are "lost boys". Their parents all seem to have died in a mass suicide at about the time of the collapse of North Korea. This event is only tangentially alluded to in the screenplay. The manner and exact circumstances of their absence are best left to the imagination. The gang members are thus a surrogate family. The members refer to each other as brothers. They are mostly petty thieves. The opening scene has them cleaning a security camera they stole from some public area. The opening scene also introduces elements of next-generation wireless technology and their vagabond lifestyle, camping out in apartments still under construction. The scene ends with their finding and electronically tagging a couple who had come to look at a new apartment and whom they would later attack and brutalize.

Scene 2 – the chinese

This scene is a kind of concession to the nationalist sensibilities of Koreans. No people anywhere will care to admit that the source of their problems might be of their own making. There is always a search first for some evidence of an outside ill-inten-

tioned actor that somehow contaminates the otherwise innocent. Koreans have been victimized by invasion and are, as a result, somewhat more prone to lay their troubles at the feet of an evil "other". The two default groups have historically been the Japanese and Americans; as the most implicated in recent Korean affairs. The former actively colonized and oppressed Koreans and the latter are seen by significant numbers of Koreans as troublemakers who, while intervening in preventing a communist takeover, also were seen to tolerate or actively support corrupt regimes. In this treatment, the evil other becomes the Chinese, who have entered Korea in growing numbers over the past century, but in significantly greater numbers lately as laborers and sometimes as shady entrepreneurs. As is the experience with immigrants everywhere, the second generation tends to form their versions of mafias or yakuza. Here they are a kind of fencing operation, taking in the ill-gotten goods in the dead of night in a way that exposes the thieves to capture, but protects them. They drive the action in this scenario by paying far too little for what Ahn had thought was a lucrative item. They get Ahn into a private booth and make him a deal to produce a live internet broadcast of a sexual assault for which they will pay well. The deal happens to contain a subtext that Koreans are aware of, that being the Japanese notorious taste for rape porn. That the Chinese are indirectly perpetrating this crime as middlemen for Japanese perverts doesn't exactly absolve Ahn and his minions, but at least partially displaces culpability and thus makes this screenplay marketable in Korea. Audiences can rationalize that the Chinese and Japanese are to blame and thereby be comforted by seeing the gang as corrupted by foreign influences, almost Pinocio-like, and thus have a modicum of empathy for them.

Scene 3 – the plan

This is a brief scene. The plan will, after all, be revealed in the ensuing action. The scene does make references to 3D porn, a natural progression in the genre that follows technological advances rather closely anyway. Here are also references to GPS tracking, which again is hardly new, but serves to show its shadow side. Ahn basically gives a pep talk to his boys in a display of his leadership. Roles are delegated and equipment readied which include demonic looking surgical masks, gloves (no fingerprints or DNA evidence), and high quality wireless webcams to stream the action.

Scene 4 – prelude to the crime

In a scene shot at night, the gang opens the victim's car trunk for Abadaba to enter into with their equipment. He rides, hidden, into the garage of the secure compound where the couple are now living. It is a tightly coordinated operation that takes just a few seconds with little sound; a point that underscores the precision of the gang as a team and speaks to their staying viable in a highly sophisticated surveillance society. Noise is clatter and clatter draws attention. There is a quick-cut to the remaining 4 gang members riding silent electric scooters homed into the GPS that the victim's car. It had been tagged earlier when the couple first visited the apartment complex where the gang was holding up while under construction. They glide into the garage opening silently from the inside where Abadaba is waiting. The scene demonstrates their high

degree of teamwork and skill in breaking and entering what would otherwise be a very secure home.

Scene 5 – the crime

The scene opens in the living room area of the couple watching 3D TV. The woman gets up to go to the kitchen just as the gang rushes into the room, violently kicking her to the floor while simultaneously kicking the man still sitting on the sofa in the head. The man is subdued with pepper spray as the woman is chloroformed and taped down to the coffee table. All the gang members are masked and wearing surgical hairnets and gloves. The equipment is quickly set up and the woman is assaulted with something called a "hot ball". She has red lipstick and heavy eye shadow applied to her face. The assault is done with a "hot ball" that causes the woman to convulse. The action is live-fed through a Chinese website.

This is a key scene in the original Stanley Kubrick film. Here it is updated to highlight the issue of sexual crime by impoverished young men locked out of marriage because of dowries or because they are deemed to have no prospects. It is precisely an issue that needs to be addressed by say, the Korean Ministry of Unification.¹⁰

Scene 6 – the bust I

This is an action sequence of discovery and escape befitting their being a savvy street gang. An alarm is tripped which alerts them to a pre-dawn raid. The scene shows that they take their own security very seriously with security equipment that they no-doubt stole. They elude capture by effecting a rooftop escape they have obviously drilled for. A full SWAT action puts them on the run. That a SWAT team was deployed also indicates that they are seen as dangerous enough to warrant such an action. All successfully get away, but it is a near thing, and only quick action from drilling for this contingency gets them out. However there is still some suspense over what their next action will be. They certainly can't go back to their lair and all of their possessions are now lost. This is a short fast-paced scene which acts as a prelude to the next episode; an encounter with a cult.

Scene 7 – the service

The gang has assembled in the shadows of a derelict church at the top of a hill in an old run-down urban area. They walk into a service that is just beginning. The "church" is brightly lit. The congregation is festive. There is music of a hybrid East Indian and Western variety with both sitar and steam organ. The entire service is a fusion of Christian and Vedic traditions. This scene, shot in a Bollywood style, depicts a multicultural Korea which happens to be a very real prospect for the nation. The "preacher" is narrating a poetic lyric over the music that goes on for about 7 minutes. The soundtrack is "Creation" from the Incredible String Band, a British psychedelic folk rock band of the 1970s. The gang is transfixed at the spectacle unfolding before them. The congregation dances to the quickening tempo of the music as the preacher continues his surrealistic message. The scene is reminiscent of the USO show from *Apocalypse Now*. It is a non-sequitur scene that sharply punctuates the whole tone of the movie in something like comic relief. There is an important dialogue between Ahn

and the preacher where Ahn asks to join the group and thereby effect an escape. He is gently but firmly rebuffed (the cult is armed with machetes) as he and his gang have no passports and they are off to the Japanese port of Shimonoseki later that day. Still, the effect of the ecstatic service and the apparent bliss of the cult followers would leave their mark on Ahn.

Scene 8 – power play

The movie now shifts to Abadaba who is cutting a deal with the Chinese. They will protect the gang, but Ahn must be given up to the authorities. He is of no use to them and a net liability by their lights. It is a moment of betrayal done out of desperation. The gang is destitute; now reduced to picking garbage from bins to survive. They are fugitives and have lost their possessions. The Chinese will protect the remaining members, but only on their terms. For them it is transactional. It is business. In their cold logic Ahn is a liability as a leader that they know they can't trust. Giving him up takes pressure off of them and wins them brownie points with the authorities. This is the savage logic of the streets. Nowhere do career criminals without MBAs roam free for long. It is a hard thing to do, but Abadaba becomes a Judas figure.

Scene 9 – Ahn is taken

This is a highly stylized sequence shot as a stand-alone guitar blues music video (soundtrack of Rory Gallagher, *A Million Miles Away*, 1976). Ahn, exhausted, is in a dive bar called "The Garden". It is an allegory to the pre-crucifixion passion of Jesus. The scene mimics Gethsemane. Ahn knows his fate. He cannot escape. He steels himself with drink while waiting for the dawn. The scene is shot in split screen as Ahn sits in anticipatory dread, drinking while his mates sleep in the back room, and Abadaba leads the police inexorably to the bar. At one point in this musical interlude Ahn stumbles to the back room and yells "You all know nothing!" though it is silent under the music but the lips are easy enough to read. He falls to the floor and the scene ends with the shadows of the police falling over him.

Scene 10 – the redemption project

This scene is shot as a legislative hearing. A Ministry of Justice official, flanked by his staff, is briefing lawmakers on the initiative to rehabilitate offenders such as Ahn. As the official is delivering his oral testimony to the committee, there are shots of Ahn being treated with aversion therapy, drugs, waterboarding and sensory deprivation. While heavily drugged he is put into a holographic chamber where he is reprogrammed with memories of childhood success and accomplishment recognized by an appreciative family and community. The combination of reprogramming and aversion therapy was reported to the committee as producing effective results, essentially curing Ahn of his psychopathy and making him a new man.¹¹ The testimony and subsequent questions and responses are framed in clinical language that are sharply contradicted by the images of Ahn's "therapy" resurrecting references to the programmatic violence that attends electroshock treatments.

Discussion

Burgess (1962) left the final chapter of *A Clockwork Orange* out of the first American edition. It had no bright ending of redemption, but rather had the protagonist succumb to his darker impulses. In the British version and in a rewritten final American chapter published after 1986 his protagonist went on to live a normal life after his treatment. In this screenplay there is similar ambiguity. Ahn can be either "Tommy" after the Who rock opera main character with delusions of messianic grandeur, or Muab Dib, the prophet from Frank Hebert's *Dune*, who changed everything by sheer will. He will likely written in the final edit as subjectively convinced of being the latter while objectively being the former. It is a fate that echoes that of Sam Lowry, the protagonist in the Terry Gilliam movie, *Brazil*, who seemed to have successfully escaped the grasp of the state, only to have it revealed that his escape was into a catatonia in the interrogation chamber.

In this sense Ahn was not a victim of North Korean political sociopathy, but an iconic reference to the psychopaths who ruled there. Only Bui, the homicidal maniac, would be a true criminal among the members of his gang. The others would be victims first of the system that orphaned them and later of Ahn who manipulated them all to his own ends. The rehabilitation referenced as the "Redemption Project" would utterly fail with anyone, despite its good intentions. Given the diversity of types encapsulated in Ahn's gang, any one-size-fits-all solution seems unlikely. The three souls in the gang who weren't psychopathic, or clinically mentally ill might respond to convention rehabilitation already offered in contemporary institutional settings. The question remaining here remains as with any empirical quasi-experimental inquiry done as a more formal study. The null hypothesis is confirmed. Where do we go from here?

In a sense this future is here, or at least unfolding. According to the Unification Ministry, the unemployment rate among the 20,000 or so recent North Korean defectors stood at 13.7 at the end of 2009, more than 4 times the jobless rate of 3.2 percent for South Koreans as a whole.¹² Those who do work usually find employment in low-end manual labor. This is an obvious formula for frustrated aspirations and resort to criminality, especially in this group's 2nd generation. Petty criminality has already popped up in the resettled North Korean communities. More than 250 defectors in Seoul and Incheon were recently arrested by the police on welfare fraud charges.¹³

As one who has been an active advocate of "service as a rite of passage to adult citizenship", this author is inclined towards policies of service to confirm citizenship. Transformative sacrifice for the greater good already exists in the North Korean social paradigm as it does less intensively in the South where almost all males are subject to compulsory military service. To create an integrative vehicle through which they could claim full citizenship in accomplishing civilian service projects (military service would become largely moot) would be consistent with common Korean values. It is already common practice for elderly citizens to be enlisted by government community centers in neighborhood litter cleanups and to participate in public events as performers. These activities are a way for them to feel productive and remain connected to their neighborhoods in a country notable for its dearth of public trash receptacles. Undertaking infrastructure and other projects would offset the investment costs in incorporating these youth into the social fabric and make them available for collateral

training in their new lives in a unified Korea. Such a program would also work under the rational design tendencies that typify Korean institutional rationale. There is little in national and community service that would be exotic to existing Korean norms. This path is thus recommended as part of a demographic hemorrhage scenario, the details of which would be determined as the circumstances and degree of this possible backdoor unification process unfolds.

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Notes

1. The use of Courier font in this extract is intentional as it is the convention for screenplays.
2. Wikileaks: Seoul feared talks on post-Kim North, September 5, 2011, Korea Joongang Daily. Retrieved September 12, 2011 from <http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/html/128/2941128.html>
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4. Retrieved October 16, 2010 from "On the Future of Books". Google. <http://booksearch.blogspot.com/2010/10/on-future-of-books.html>
5. From Googlebooks database. For further information on Googlebooks and the ngram viewer, go to <http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/info> (Retrieved June 13, 2011).
6. A useful site with contextual information and frequent updates on conditions in Yemen is: <http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/unity/unify.htm>
7. It is worth remembering that by the Byzantine standards of Middle Eastern historical narrative, Iraq had a pretty good claim to Kuwait as its "19th province". To put it over-simply, the Al Sabah family successfully lobbied for its own franchise from the British who oversaw the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I that created modern Iraq and Kuwait. See, Duiker, William J.; Spielvogel, Jackson J. *World History: From 1500*. 5th edition. Belmont, California, USA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007. p. 839; and Cleveland, William L. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 2nd Ed pg. 463. That "friendly" Kuwait would be absorbed by "hostile" Iraq was naturally unacceptable given the immense shift in oil resources in play, and its larger potential threat to Saudi interests.
8. There was the absorption of Zanzibar into Tanganyika, but this was largely a consensual rectification of a colonial division of a city-state enclave into a larger nation during the decolonization period in Africa in the 1960s.
9. The Ministry of Reunification was established in 1998 during a period of increased initiatives aimed at promoting inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. Prior to that South Korea had a reunification board which as established in 1969 under then President Park Chung-hee.

10. In the screenplay no full nudity will be shot on the premises of both prudence (sexual nudity would almost certainly be censored) and as a means to actually intensify the scene. Such acts are best left to one's imagination as with the appearance of monsters or killers in horror genres. The most provocative shot in the script is a side view of a consulting torso. The point is not to arouse, but to depict an act in a graphic way that marks it as starkly and pathologically criminal.
11. For readers of Jon Ronson's *The Psychopath Test*, they will know of very similar therapies used on psychopaths in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s with catastrophic results. Readers of Ronson will also know that the consensus in the psychiatric community is that psychopathy is incurable. Readers will also know that Ahn fits the 20 point psychopathy assessment developed by Hare almost perfectly.
12. Defector Policy Under Criticism as Inflow Rises, *Korea JoongAng Daily* (In association with *International Herald Tribune*), (2010, July 12). Retrieved June 12, 2011 from <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2923050>
13. Ibid.

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